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 I. Introduction: 
Wages and salaries differ systematically by gender and race. For example, in the United 
States, women working full-time earn only $0.79 for every dollar earned by their male 
counterparts (Blau and Kahn 2016) and, even controlling for education, experience, metro status, 
and region of residence, black men earn $0.78 for every dollar earned by white men (Wilson and 
Rogers 2016). Differences in occupation, skills, and job characteristics may explain some of 
these differences in wages but discrimination in the labor market is also prevalent (Blau and 
Kahn 2016, Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003). This study examines discrimination both by race 
and by foreign-born status in the context of Major League Baseball [MLB]. 
Becker (1951) outlines three sources of taste-based discrimination in labor markets: 
employer-based, employee-based, and customer-based. In the case of sports, employers who are 
biased against one type of player may be less willing to pay players equally based upon this 
prejudice. Players who are biased against a type of player may request more money to work with 
players whom they are biased against. Finally fans may be less willing to attend games or pay 
money to watch players whom they are biased against. Customer discrimination can be 
determined empirically by the effects on fan attendance of the addition of a player with a certain 
set of characteristics, while employer- and employee-based discrimination can be shown 
empirically by wage penalties for players with different characteristics. The goal of this study is 
to determine if employer-based discrimination is present in the MLB by looking for average 
differences in wages amongst groups and by looking for differences in returns to on-field output 
for players of different groups. 
The MLB is an interesting industry to look for evidence of discrimination because it is 
one of the few industries where employee output is clear to see and compensation information is 
widely available, which is unusual for labor market studies. Economic discrimination studies in 
the MLB can still use the same tools that other studies of discrimination use but differences 
between groups can be shown more clearly than in general labor market studies where workers 
are employed in broad range of industries. Sports is an interesting laboratory for economic ideas 
because even though the players make up a small percentage of people in America and earn 
substantially more than the average person, sports in America are thought of as capturing the 
ideals of America where hard work and dedication are rewarded (Kahn 2000). The MLB also has 
a long history of segregation prior to the beginning of integration in the League in 1947 
(Hansenn 1998) and evidence of wage penalties in the MLB has also been found as recently as 
2001 (Palmer & King 2006).  
 The Mincer equation from Jacob Mincer’s 1958 article “Investment in Human Capital 
and Personal Income Distribution” is the tool I use to estimate discrimination. This model 
decomposes wages into different causal factors for homogenous groups and is based upon human 
capital theory where earnings are a function of investments in human capital, i.e. training and 
experience. The inclusion of a dummy variable into a Mincer equation allows us to account for 
non-numerical, categorical factors that affect wages, such as race and nativity which take form of 
wage penalties and wage premiums between groups. These wage penalties are only robust if the 
Mincer equation accurately captures the relationship between human capital and wages. Lemieux 
(2003) finds that the Mincer Equation, with a few modifications, is still an accurate and useful 
tool today.  
 Using the MLB as the context to study discrimination solves some of the prototypical 
problems seen in labor market studies. Most studies suffer because they focus on industries 
where employee output is not clear to see and wage information may not be available and 
because the choice of industry may itself be caused by discrimination. This problem of not being 
able to directly measure ability is not present in the MLB because a player’s ability is readily 
seen in their performance statistics measured on an individual level. Not only is a player’s output 
directly observable, their salary information is readily available to the public as well, making the 
MLB a unique labor market where employer-employee contracts are directly observable while 
employee output and other factors that affect wages are simultaneously discernible. Therefore, 
the Mincer equation is an ideal equation to use for studying discrimination in the MLB because 
we can measure the direct effect of visible inputs of human capital on wages. 
II. Literature Review: 
1. General Economic Studies of Discrimination 
 Studies of economic discrimination focus on two key ideas: long term inequalities based 
upon a group’s characteristics and differences on returns to inputs of human capital for different 
categories of people based upon those characteristics. Studies of economic discrimination focus 
upon these inequalities for groups as a whole rather than at an individual level, because if 
discrimination is present it would present itself in a systematic and widespread manner. 
Neoclassical economists consider discrimination to be distaste for a specific type of worker, 
where employers are willing to subject themselves to costs in order to allow their discrimination 
to take place. (Chakraborty 2016) Other authors such as Arrow (1973) call discrimination the 
placing of value on something other than productive inputs in labor markets. Becker (1951) 
famously follows the taste-based theory of discrimination where he views employers, coworkers, 
and customers as sources of discrimination. Some economists do not find issue with certain types 
of discrimination. For instance, Phelps (1972) believe that during some forms of discrimination 
are useful, like statistical discrimination, where firms use rational information to maximize 
utility. Statistical discrimination is when group averages are used as approximations for actual 
information about an individual, which is not against the law. 
2. Discrimination Studies in Major League Baseball 
Studies of economic discrimination in sports blossomed in the 1970s. One of the first 
studies, Scully (1974), looks for evidence of racial discrimination in all major league sports 
following desegregation and finds mixed evidence in the MLB. Scully finds that black players 
were more often placed in non-leadership roles, such as in the outfield, but that black players 
outperform white players even in positions where they are underrepresented. Scully finds that 
black players are not paid on average less than white players when only salaries are compared 
but black players are paid less for creating similar offensive output to white players. Scully also 
finds that black players earn incrementally more for each additional year of experience than 
white players do, which Scully attributes to the entry barrier where black players have to 
consistently outperform white players to stay in the Major Leagues. However, in the 1970s, the 
difference in returns to experience was not enough to overcome the white/black salary gap over 
the average career in the Major Leagues. Scully also looks at the effects of the addition of black 
players on fan attendance and finds that the addition of black players led to decreased team 
revenue because of decreases in fan attendance. Scully links the wage penalty for black players 
to the customer-based taste discrimination described by Becker (1951).   
Customer-based discrimination is not consistently found to be the source of wage 
penalties. Gwartney and Hayworth (1974) study the effects of the integration of Major League 
Baseball and the Negro League after 1947, where experienced black players became available to 
Major League Baseball teams. Teams that added more black players saw an increase in their 
winning percentages from 1952-1956. Gwartney and Hayworth (1974) find that black players are 
more productive than whites on field and that the increase in productivity on team winning 
percentages led to an overall increase in team attendance, at a rate of 60,000 increased fans in 
attendance per black player that was added, rather than a decrease in attendance—evidence 
against consumer discrimination. Gwartney and Hayworth (1974)  find that this figure holds 
even amongst teams with losing records because of the “superstar effect” where fans go to see 
players with exceptional talent regardless of the players ethnicity or the team’s overall ability to 
win.  
Later studies found little to no evidence of discrimination in the MLB. Kahn (2000) 
reviews several studies from the 1980’s and finds little to no evidence of discrimination in the 
MLB. Palmer and King (2006) found evidence of salary discrimination limited to lower salaried 
Hispanic players and lower salaried black players as compared to similar lower salaried white 
players in the 2001 season.  
Studies have also looked into the impact of foreign players on Major League Baseball. 
Tainsky, Scott, and Winfree (2010) study the effects of international players on attendance in 
Major League Baseball from 1985 to 2005. Initially, adding a foreign-born player of any race to 
a team produced a decrease in attendance at a diminishing rate until 1993, but increased game 
attendance from 1993 until the 2005, but also at a diminishing rate so the effect peaked in 2000. 
Tainsky, Scott, and Winfree (2010) believe that the increase in attendance was due to teams 
getting a larger percentage of players that match the demographics of their area as well as an 
increase in global interest in baseball. Though not directly relevant, Ottenson (2014) looks at the 
social costs of Major League Baseball for Latin American and Caribbean countries and posits 
that the relationship between the MLB and that Caribbean is similar to past models of 
colonialism because of the less restrictive rules governing signing players from the Caribbean as 
compared to Japan.  
3. Studies of Major League Baseball Wage Determination 
A. Players Studied 
 Studies of wage determination in the MLB have attempted to capture the returns to 
ability, experience, and other characteristics on player earnings. These studies inform my choice 
of control variables in my empirical specification. These studies have had to break down the 
larger group of all MLB players into groups of similar composition in order to determine these 
driving factors of wages. The most obvious breakdown is pitchers and non-pitchers as these two 
types of players generally have opposing roles: run creation and run prevention, respectively. 
Most studies have followed this division by focusing solely on pitchers or non-pitchers. Palmer 
and King (2006), Wiseman and Chatterjee (2003), and Yilmaz and Chatterjee (2003) focus 
solely on non-pitchers, while Krautman et al. (2003) focuses on pitchers. Palmer and King 
(2006) further broke their study of non-pitchers into groups based on salary levels, while 
Krautman et al. (2003) broke their study down further into pitcher types. 
B. Factors of Salary other than Ability 
 Aside from the effect of ability on earnings, studies of wage discrimination in the MLB 
have tried to partial out the effects that different individual, team, and demographic factors have 
on player earnings. Scully (1974), Depken (2000), and Sommers and Quinton (1982) look not 
only at team performance, but the size of the metropolitan area that teams play in, as players who 
play in larger, more urban areas have a larger fan base than players in smaller cities. Tainsky and 
Winfree (2010) look at the effect of the price of attendance, and the demographics of the cities 
that teams played in, and the quality of the stadium when they studied the effect of foreign-born 
players on attendance. Hanssen (1998) notes the differences in uptake of players in different 
leagues, as the National League was more willing to accept non-white players and, for a period 
of time, was known to focus on hiring players based solely on ability, while the American 
League was slower to hire non-white players. Depken (2000) looks at the effects that a team 
payroll has on earnings and the effect of having players with large disparities in earnings on team 
performance.  The consideration of non-race based, individual factors aside from output has also 
been studied. Kahn (1993) looked at the effects of being arbitration eligible and being a free 
agent on player earnings and contract length in the MLB. Sommers (1982) found that players 
who are not in free agency are paid below their marginal product of revenue. Yilmaz and 
Chatterjee (2003) also considered the effects of owner’s goals on player earnings and found that 
players who maximize fan attendance help owners meet their goals of winning and increasing 
revenue. Lucifora and Simmons (2003) discuss the effects of superstars in sports on wages 
overall. 
III. Methods: 
 The goal of my research was to determine if economic discrimination based upon a 
player’s race and nativity is present in the MLB. To test for this I looked for average differences 
in earnings amongst groups and differences in returns to offensive output for groups with 
different ethnicities and nativities. I used a Mincer Equation in order to determine the effects of 
race and nativity on average differences in wages and on differences in returns to output. The 
Standard Mincer Equation is: 
Log (earnings) = β0 + β1Years of schooling + β2Years of experience + β3Years of Experience2 + 
υ 
In this equation, years of schooling is a rough approximation of an individual’s ability and years 
of experience is the number of years in the labor force that someone has with a squared term to 
show the marginal returns to an additional year of labor force experience changes with the level 
of experience. In the MLB, ability does not need to be approximated by a stand-in variable like 
education because it is directly observable and quantified in numerous statistics. Therefore in my 
model I replace the variable education with a variable that shows the player’s on-field output, 
which allows me to precisely estimate the returns to a player’s ability. 
 Different control variables can be added to a Mincer Equation in order to capture the 
effects of other factors on wages aside from the returns to experience and ability. After looking 
at previous studies of wage determination in the MLB, I decided to add variables that took into 
account the specific characteristics of the player, specific characteristics of the team that the 
player was on, and the specific characteristics of the location of the team. Bivariate variables that 
represented a player’s race and nativity were added to the equation in order to show the average 
differences in wages for players of different races and nativities. When these bivariate variables 
are interacted with the variable for a player’s output the differences in returns for output based 
upon race and nativity are shown.  
IV. Data and Measures: 
1. Data Sources:  
Player Salary information comes primarily from USAToday.com, which lists the salaries 
of all starting players in the MLB by season, with supplementary salary data coming from 
Spotrac.com for players not included in the USAToday.com data. Salaries were available for 
3,264 of the original 3,322 player-season observations for MLB players with a minimum of 200 
at bats. Player on-field output statistics were attained from Fangraphs.com for all players in the 
data sample. Demographic data came from a variety of sources. Player race was not self-reported 
and was determined from pictures of the players found on Google Images, at my own discretion 
based upon phenotypes. Citydemographic data was taken for the cities that each team plays in 
from the 2010 Census, which is the most recent year for this data available. The data for Toronto 
demographics was taken from the 2011 Canadian Census, also the most recent available data. 
Team statistics regarding divisional information and playoff appearances come from MLB.com. 
Team Opening Day Payroll Information comes from stevetheump.com.  
 
2. Sample Definition:  
I use an independently pooled cross section of MLB players over the last two Collective 
Bargaining Agreements, from 2007-2016 based off a three selective factors. First, a player had to 
have at least 200 at bats in a single MLB season. Second, their salary information had to be 
available online. Third, the player had to be on only one team per season in order to accurately 
account for team and demographic effects. The at bats qualifier was chosen for multiple reasons. 
First, this level of at bats indicates that a player’s offensive output was representative of their 
true ability not subject to large variances due to the limiting effects of a small sample size. 
Second, this number of at bats excluded two categories of players who would disrupt the positive 
correlation between offensive output and salary, pitchers and marginal players.  
A pitcher is more likely than other position player to have their salary based primarily 
upon their defensive capabilities, rather than their offensive capabilities. This means that their 
lack of offensive output may make it appear that high returns for lower abilities in offensive 
output. By removing pitchers I also eliminate problems associated with quantifying defensive 
output which is intrinsically harder to measure than hitter output (Krautman et al, 2003). Further, 
Krautmann et al. (2003) shows that measuring output for pitchers requires breaking pitchers 
down into different categories and using different metrics of ability whereas all hitters can be 
evaluated using the same offensive output statistic. These problems were not seen in aggregating 
offensive output amongst players of different positions as all players offensive output can be 
measured using the Weight Runs Created Statistic: wRC (described in Appendix A). 
The at bat sample floor also prevented the inclusion of marginal players into the study. 
The inclusion of marginal players would be subject to two pitfalls. First, their performance 
would be limited to a small data sample, which means that their offensive output may not be 
truly representative of their abilities. Second, there is also an issue in comparing the correlation 
of output to salaries of marginal players to players who are in the MLB full time because of 
contract rules. The minimum salaries for marginal players differ significantly from those of full 
time MLB players. Over the past two collective bargaining agreements the minimum salaries of 
full time MLB players has ranged from a low of $380,000 in 2007 to a high of $505,500 in 2016. 
Meanwhile the highest MLB minimum salary for marginal MLB players has only peaked at 
~$90,000 in 2016 (2012-2016 MLB Collective Bargaining Agreement). 
After the requirements for entry to the data sample were met, players were broken down 
into three categories based upon years of experience. This follows Palmer and King (2006) who 
broke their sample down into three categories based on income. My categories were based upon 
the different contractual periods of an MLB player who enters through the Rule 4 draft: being 
restricted to fielding offers only from his team (Years 1-3, being eligible for contract arbitration 
with that team (Years 4-6), and free agency (Years 7+) where players can field offers from 
multiple teams. Foreign born players (other than Puerto Ricans and Canadians) do not enter 
through the Rule 4 draft and are free agents immediately. However, I still include them in their 
respective experience category rather than classifying them immediately as free agents. Players 
who enter through the Rule 4 Draft are subject to fielding offers from only the team that drafts 
them & they cannot entertain offers from any other teams until they reach free agency. 
My study uses years of MLB experience as a proxy for the type of contract that an MLB 
player has, as contract type directly influences player salary levels. Even though players from 
outside the US, Canada, and Puerto Rico receive free agency status inherently from their start, I 
believe that these contracts are not as long and lucrative as free agent contracts for MLB players 
with more than 6 years of experience as teams may be hesitant to pay these players at a level 
similar to MLB players with 7-plus years of experience, as they would not have MLB-proven 
levels of ability that are shown to be above average in the MLB. Years of experience are an 
appropriate approximation for these groups, as players with similar levels of MLB experience are 
more directly comparable than players with vastly different levels of experience.  
With all of these restrictions, the sample includes 3,170 player-season observations: 839 
player-season observations were for players in the first 3 years of their MLB service, 923 player-
season observations were for players in their 4th-6th years of service, and 1408 player-season 
observations were for players who had reached free agency status. The 3,170 player-season 
observations represent 25.1% of the 12,606 total MLB player-season observations of players 
with at least 1 at-bat from 2007-2016. 
 
3. Data Measures:  
 Variable interpretation remains constant throughout the 6 different models. ForeignBorn 
is a bivariate variable that varies by individual and is equal to 1 if the player was born outside of 
the United States, Canada, or Puerto Rico (meaning that the player did not enter the Major 
Leagues through the Rule 4 Draft). This bivariate variable was set equal to 1 if this player did not 
have any draft data present on fangraphs.com Black is a bivariate variable that varies by 
individual and is equal to 1 if the player if the player is Black. Hispanic is a bivariate variable 
that varies by individual and is equal to 1 if the player is Hispanic. Individual characteristics are 
continuous variables that vary by individuals and through time which include: the player’s years 
of experience in the Major Leagues, that term again, squared, and the players offensive output 
measured in units of wRC (see Appendix A). Team characteristics vary by individuals and 
through time and are measured by: the team’s overall payroll for a season as a continuous 
variable; a bivariate variable for whether or not a team was in the playoffs in the past season, the 
winning percentage of the team for that season, and the team payroll measured in logs. 
Demographic characteristics are continuous variables that vary by individual, but all data is from 
the 2010 Census so they do not vary over time. The demographic characteristics include the size 
of the population in logs, the percentage of that city that is black, the percentage of the city that 
is Hispanic, and the percentage of the city that is from an immigrant background. Season fixed 
effects vary by time and capture the average change in wages per season relative to the 2007 
season. 
 The bivariate variables that are included for race act as a means of separating the average 
difference in wage of that variable from the average wage of a non-Black, non-Hispanic player, 
it would have been ideal to also estimate the effect of being Asian but the portion of the sample 
that is non-black and non-Hispanic is 99.09% white (and there are almost zero non-foreign born 
Asian players in the MLB), so effectively these average differences are in comparison to the 
average wages of a white player. The bivariate variables that are included for nativity act as a 
means of separating out the average difference in wages of foreign born players from the average 
wage of a player born in the United States, Canada, or Puerto Rico. The interactions between 
race/ethnicity and nativity allow for comparison of those players to white players born in the 
United States, Canada, or Puerto Rico. When foreign-born status is interacted with race and 
ethnicity, the foreign born category represents foreign-born Asian players because all foreign 
born players are either Hispanic, Hispanic and Black, or Asian. 
 The interactions between race and offensive output, nativity and offensive output, and the 
interactions of race, nativity, and offensive output allow us to determine the average additional 
effect of being a player in one of the corresponding categories on wages for differing levels of 
offensive output relative to white players for race/offensive output interactions and relative to 
white/Asian players born in the United States, Canada, or Puerto Rico for race/nativity/output 
interactions. 
4. Means Table:   
Means Tables can be found in the attached appendices in the tables & Figures Section in 
tables 1a, 1b, 2a, & 2b.  The means table shows that my sample consists mainly of white 
players and that most players tend to have been in the league for multiple seasons, which 
makes sense as my at bats floor drives up the average ability of players. 
1. Models  
Six models were devised in order to capture differences in average wages between groups 
and the differences in returns to output between groups based upon race and nativity. Models 1 
and 2 test for differences in wages by race and nativity separately, with Model 2 having a team 
fixed effect variable added for a robustness check. Models 3 and 4 test for differences in wages 
by race, nativity, and their interaction, with Model 4 having an additional team fixed effect added 
for a robustness check. Model 5 tests for differences in productivity on wages by race and 
nativity separately. Model 6 tests for differences in productivity on wages by race, nativity, and 
their interaction. All four samples of MLB players were run on these models. Please note, that 
for the sample containing all MLB players, two additional variables were added into each 
equation, a bivariate variable that was equal to 1 if the player was in years 4-6 of his MLB 
service, as that is when MLB players who enter the league through the Rule 4 Draft (the general 
MLB draft) become arbitration eligible and a bivariate variable that was equal to 1 if the player 
was in years 7+ of his MLB service, as that is when all players become free agents. These 
variables were added to capture the effects of contract type on earnings as described in the 
sample definitions. Additionally, fully defined models can be viewed in the Appendices in 
Appendix B. 
A. Differences in Wages by Race and Nativity Separately: 
Formally Model 1 is: 
Log(wage)= β0+ β1ForeignBorni + β2Blacki + β3Hispanici+ β4-9individual characteristicsit+ β10-
13team characteristicsit + β14-17demographic characteristicsi+ β18season fixed effectst+µi  
Where i indexes individuals, t indexes time based on MLB seasons and µi denotes the individual 
unobserved error. 
 
B. Differences in Wages by Race and Nativity Separately with the Inclusion of Team Fixed 
Effects: 
Formally Model 2 is: 
Log(wage)= β0+ β1ForeignBorni + β2 Blacki + β3Hispanici+ β4-9individual characteristicsit+ β10-
13team characteristicsit + β14-17demographic characteristicsi+ β18season fixed effectst+ β19team 
fixed effectsi+µi 
Where i indexes individuals, t indexes time based on MLB seasons and µi denotes the individual 
unobserved error. 
C. Differences in Wages by Race, Nativity, and their interaction: 
Formally Model 3 is: 
Log(wage)= β0+ β1ForeignBorni + β2 Blacki + β3Hispanici+ β4ForeignBorn*Hispanici+ 
β5ForeignBorn*Black*Hispanici+ β6-11individual characteristicsit+ β12-16team characteristicsit + 
β17-20demographic characteristicsi+ β21season fixed effectst +µi 
Where i indexes individuals, t indexes time based on MLB seasons and µi denotes the individual 
unobserved error. 
D. Differences in Wages by Race, Nativity, and their interaction with the Inclusion of Team 
Fixed Effects: 
Formally Model 4 is: 
Log(wage)= β0+ β1ForeignBorni + β2 Blacki + β3Hispanici + β4ForeignBorn*Hispanici+ 
β5ForeignBorn*Black*Hispanici+ β6-11individual characteristicsit+ β12-16team characteristicsit + 
β17-20demographic characteristicsi+ β21season fixed effectst+ β22 team fixed effectsit +µi 
Where i indexes individuals, t indexes time based on MLB seasons and µi denotes the individual 
unobserved error. 
E. Differences in Productivity on Wages by Race and Nativity separately:  
Formally Model 5 is: 
Log(wage)= β0+ β1ForeignBorni + β2Blacki + β3Hispanici + β4Black*wRCit + β5Hispanic*wRCit 
+ β6ForeignBorn*Hispanic*wRCit + β7ForeignBorn*Black*Hispanic*wRCit + β8-12individual 
characteristicsit+ β13-16team characteristicsit + β17-20demographic characteristicsi+ β21season fixed 
effectst + µi 
 Where i indexes individuals, t indexes time based on MLB seasons and µi denotes the individual 
unobserved error. 
F. Model 6: Differences in Productivity on Wages by Race, Nativity, and their interaction: 
Formally Model 6 is: 
Log(wage)= β0+ β1ForeignBorni + β2Blacki + β3Hispanici +β4ForeignBorn*wRCit + 
β5Black*wRCit + β6Hispanic*wRCit + β7ForeignBorn*Hispanic*wRCit + 
β8ForeignBorn*Black*Hispanic*wRCit + β9-13individual characteristicsit+ β14-17team 
characteristicsit + β18-21demographic characteristicsi+ β22 season fixed effectst + µi 




 Tables of the Regression models can be found in the attached appendices in the Figures 
& Tables section. 
1. Differences in Wages by Race and Nativity Separately  
Table 3 Reports the Results of Model 1. After fixing player, team, and city demographic 
characteristics, being a player from outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico with any 
contract type, is associated with an average wage premium of 9.4% as compared to players from 
the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico of all contract types, which is significant at the 5% 
level of significance. Additionally, the fixture of player, team, and demographic characteristics 
finds that black players of all contract types are not paid statistically significantly differently than 
white players of all contract types, but Hispanic players of all contract types have an average 
wage penalty of 7.57% as compared to white players of all contract types. The wage premium 
seen by players of all contract types from outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico is 
likely a continuation of the initial wage premium that these players see in the first three years of 
their contract, as they have more bargaining power for their initial salaries than players from the 
United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico.  
Once the sample is broken down into groups by contract type and player, team, and 
demographic characteristics are fixed, players in years 1-3 of MLB service that are from outside 
the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico are found to see a large wage premium of 41.8% as 
compared to similar players from the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico, significant at the 
1% level of significance. This premium declines through time as arbitration eligible players from 
outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico are found to not have statistically 
significantly different wages than arbitration eligible players from United States, Canada, and 
Puerto Rico. This initial wage premium becomes a wage penalty for free agent players as players 
from outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico are found to have a 10.7% wage penalty 
as compared to free agent players from the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico at a 10% 
level of significance. The disappearance of the wage premium is most likely caused by players 
who enter the MLB through the Rule 4 Draft becoming eligible to field offers from multiple 
teams.  
 Additionally, when the sample is broken into groups based on contract types and player, 
team, and demographic characteristics are fixed, black and Hispanic players in years 1-3 of MLB 
service are found to have wage penalties of 9.7% and 11.7% respectively as compared to white 
players with 1-3 years of MLB service, at the 10% level of significance. Hispanic players with 4-
6 years of experience continue to see this wage penalty, as they are paid an average of 13% less 
than white players with comparable levels of experience, at the 10% level of significance, but 
this wage penalty disappears in free agency where Hispanic free agents are not paid statistically 
significantly differently than white players. Black players see a reverse trend from Hispanics, as 
black players in years 4-6 of their MLB service are not paid differently than white players and 
black free agents have an average wage premium of 16.7%, statistically significant at the 1% 
level of confidence, as compared to white free agents. These average wage penalties for players 
in years 1-3 could be a result of employer discrimination and are similar to the results of Palmer 
and King (2006). Scully (1974) found that black players produce more offensive output than 
white players and have a higher marginal return to each year of experience than white players do, 
which may lead to this wage premium. This premium could also be caused by the superstar 
effect of players on their own wages, which drives up their salary as described by Lucifer and 
Simmons (2003). 
Figure 1 shows the regression results in terms of average predicted wages for players of 
each category grouped by race and nativity separately. FB shows the average predicted wages for 
players from outside of the US, Canada, and Puerto Rico. These players in Figure 1 are shown to 
have a significant wage premiums for players from outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto 
Rico that appear during the first three years of a players contract and lasts through the period 
where players are arbitration eligible. White players are also predicted to have higher wages 
through initially and through the arbitration eligible period, but during free agency, black players 
average predicted salary surpasses that of whites, the Hispanic player average predicted salary 
never catches up. Figure 1 shows that the type of contract a player has affects how big the real 
change in salary is i.e. the 41.8% premium for players from outside the United States, Canada, 
and Puerto Rico is equal to an average wage premium of ~$162,000 while the 16.7% wage 
premium for black free agents is equal to an average wage premium of ~$900,000. 
2. Model 3: Differences in Wages by Race, Nativity, and their interaction: 
When Model 1 is changed to add interaction between players’ race and nativity the 
results, shown in Table 5, change significantly when player, team, and city demographic 
characteristics are held fixed. Only players of all contract types from outside the United States, 
Canada, and Puerto Rico who are non-black and non-Hispanic (i.e. Asian) or are from outside 
the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico and are Hispanic, but not black see statistically 
significant average wage differentials from white players from the United States, Canada, and 
Puerto Rico. Players of all contract types from outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto 
Rico who are Asian have an average wage premium of 41.6% as compared to players of all 
contract types who are white and from the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. Players of all 
contract types from outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico who are non-black and 
Hispanic have an average wage premium of 1.1% as compared to players of all contract types 
who are white from the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. This is the sum of the 
statistically significant coefficients for foreign-born Hispanic players. These premiums again are 
probably due to the initial earnings premium that players from outside the US, Canada, and 
Puerto Rico see due to their ability to field multiple offers from teams that lasts through time. 
When this model is broken down into samples by years of experience again, only players 
from outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico who are Asian or are from outside the 
United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico and are Hispanic, but not black see statistically 
significant average wage differentials from white players from the United States, Canada, and 
Puerto Rico during their first three years in the Major Leagues and years 4-6.  During the first 3 
years of their MLB service, Asian players from outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto 
Rico have a 94.3% average wage premium, significant at the 1% level of significance, as 
compared to white players from the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico with comparable 
years of service. While in years 4-6, Asian players from outside the United States, Canada, and 
Puerto Rico have a 46.7% average wage premium, significant at the 1% level of significance, as 
compared to white players from the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico with comparable 
years of service. The larger wage premium for Asian players is likely due to the formal process 
of hiring players from Japan and South Korea described by Ottenson (2014), while no formal 
process exists for teams to bid on players from South America, Mexico, and the Caribbean. This 
premium appears to continue through the player’s career until all players reach free agency 
where this premium disappears as it did for all players from outside the United States, Canada, 
and Puerto Rico in model 1. The wage premium for all players from outside the United States, 
Canada, and Puerto Rico is likely driven by the large wage premium for Asian players. This 
smaller premium could be due to the informal process of hiring a player that is not from an Asian 
League or it could be due to discrimination. 
During the first three years of MLB service Hispanic, non-black players from outside the 
United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico see a 24.6% wage premium, statistically significant at 
the 1% level of significance, as compared to white players with similar experience from the 
United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. During the arbitration eligible period of MLB service 
Hispanic, non-black players from outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico only see a 
3.8% wage premium, statistically significant at the 1% level of significance, as compared to 
white players with similar experience from the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico.  Again, 
this smaller premium could be due to the informal process of hiring a player that is not from an 
Asian League or it could be due to discrimination. It is interesting to note that players from 
outside the United States, Canada, or Puerto Rico who are Hispanic and black do not see the 
same wage premiums that non-black Hispanics do.	
Figure 2 shows the average predicted salaries of players from model 3, based upon their 
race and nativity status. Here, we see the predicted wages of Figure 1 broken down into narrower 
categories, which provides more detail to the study. Asian players that are not born in the US, 
Canada, and Puerto Rico are predicted to be paid significantly more than players from the US 
and Canada and Puerto Rico during the first 6 years of their contract, while Players from outside 
the US, Canada, and Puerto Rico who are black and Hispanic only see an average wage premium 
during the first 3 years of their MLB service. As seen in Figure 1, players who are black or black 
and Hispanic see significantly higher average predicted wages than white or Hispanic players, 
regardless of nativity status. Black and Hispanic players from the US, Canada, and Puerto Rico 
are not predicted to see an average wage premium, but a wage penalty as compared to the 
average predicted salaries of white players through the first six years of their contracts following 
the results of Palmer and King (2006). 
 
 
3. Differences in Productivity on Wages by Race and Nativity separately: 
Table 7 reports the results of Model 5, which takes a different approach than the previous 
two models. This model looks to see if players receive different compensation for offensive 
output, by seeing if there is an extra effect on wages for players based on nativity and race. The 
term for wRC, which measures offensive output, was interacted separately in Model 5 with race 
and nativity. After fixing for player characteristics aside from output, team characteristics, and 
city demographic characteristics, players of all contract types from outside the US, Canada, and 
Puerto Rico do not see an average differences in wages as compared to players of all contract 
types from the US, Canada, and Puerto Rico, nor do they see a difference in returns to increases 
in wRC compared to players of all contract types from the US, Canada, and Puerto Rico. Players 
from outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico who are in the first 3 years of their 
MLB service also do not see an average wage differential from players from the United States, 
Canada, and Puerto Rico, but they do see a 0.55% additional return to every marginal increase in 
wRC as compared to players from the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico, significant at the 
5% level of significance. Given that the average ranges of wRC range from 40-110, this can be a 
substantial wage premium for players from outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. 
As expected, there is no average wage premium or difference in returns to offensive output for 
premium for players from outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico as compared to 
players from the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico when all players reach free agency. This 
means that the wage premium seen for players from outside the US, Canada, and Puerto Rico in 
model is mostly likely driven by their increases in returns to offensive output. 
Hispanic players in their first 6 years of MLB service see a statistically significant 
average wage penalty as compared to white players in their first 6 years of MLB service, -29.8% 
in years 1-3 and -33.7% in years 4-6, both significant at the 5% level of significance, but they see 
a larger return to offensive output as compared to white players in years 1-3, but not years 4-6. 
This is enough to make up the average wage penalty for Hispanic players in years 1-3, as long as 
the player is at least of average ability (wRC greater than 55). Black free agent players see a 
statistically significant average wage premium of 59.1%, statistically significant at the 1% level 
of significance, as compared to white free agent players with a- 0.07% decrease in returns to 
offensive output as compared to white players. This means that black free agents are paid on 
average more than white players, but they are compensated less for each run produced, which 
may be evidence of discrimination. This higher average wage premium, again, could be due to 
other effects such as the superstar effect of players on their salaries rather than just higher returns 
to player output as Scully (1974) suggests.  
4. Differences in Productivity on Wages by Race, Nativity, and their interaction: 
Table 8 reports the results of model 6, which is similar to model 5, but includes 
interaction terms for offensive output with categories based on race and nativity. When 
characteristics of players outside offensive output, team characteristics, and demographic 
characteristics are held fixed a mix of results is found. Asian players from outside the United 
States, Canada, and Puerto Rico see large average wage premiums for players of all contract 
types, which is driven by the large average wage premiums that they see in years 1-3 and 4-6, of 
86.4% and 218.9% respectively, both significant at the 1% level of significance. However, 
during years 4-6, Asian players from outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico see 3% 
less marginally for returns to increases in offensive output than white players from the United 
States, Canada, and Puerto Rico, significant at the 5% level of significance. Players from outside 
the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico who are black and Hispanic do not see an average 
wage penalty or premium as compared to white players from the United States, Canada, and 
Puerto Rico, but in years 1-3 of MLB service they see -0.9% less for every marginal increase of 
wRC as compared to white players from the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico, significant 
at the 5% level of significance, suggesting some evidence of discrimination. 
Continuing to hold characteristics of players outside offensive output, team 
characteristics, and demographical characteristics fixed, players who are Hispanic, but not black 
from outside of the United States, Canada, and Puerto see average wage penalties of -16.9% 
during years 1-3 of MLB service and average wage penalties of -29.4% during years 4-6 of MLB 
service as compared to white players from the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico, both 
significant at the 1% level of significance. However, Hispanic players in years 4-6 of MLB 
service do see 0.63% larger marginal returns to increases in wRC than white players from the 
United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. These average wage penalties may also be evidence of 
discrimination in The MLB. 
Finally, continuing to hold characteristics of players outside offensive output, team 
characteristics, and demographical characteristics fixed, black players who are from the United 
States, Canada, and Puerto Rico see an average wage premium of 50.5% during free agency as 
compared to white players from the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico, statistically 
significant at the 5% level of significance. However, these players see -.6% less for each 
marginal increase of wRC than white players from the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. 
This smaller return to increases in offensive output suggests that the higher average wages of 
black players from the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico is likely due to other factors aside 
from increases in wRC. 
5. Differences in Wages by Race and Nativity Separately with the Inclusion of Team 
Fixed Effects: 
When an additional variable for team fixed effects is added to model 1, creating model 2 
for a robustness check, the results of Model 1 change slightly. This team fixed effect uses 
variation within teams rather than between teams. Table 4 reports the results of model 2. Before 
players are broken up by contract types, but player, team, and demographic characteristics are 
held fixed, players of all contract types from outside of the United States, Canada, and Puerto 
Rico still see an average wage premium of 8.17%, statistically significant at the 10% level of 
significance, as compared to players of all contract types from the United States, Canada, and 
Puerto Rico, which is slightly smaller than the premium from Model 1. Black players of all 
contract types are still not found to be paid differently than white players of all contract types at 
any conventional level of significance. Hispanic players of all contract types still see an average 
wage penalty as compared to white players of all contract types, but it is slightly smaller at -
6.55%, statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. Although the coefficients may be 
slightly different the overall trends remain the same when variations within teams are considered 
rather than variations between teams. 
When the sample is again broken down by player contract type and player, team, and 
demographical characteristics are held fixed, the results still hold similar to Model 1. Players in 
years 1-3 of MLB service that are from outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico are 
found to see an initial wage premium of 41.7% as compared to similar players from the United 
States, Canada, and Puerto Rico which is significant at the 1% level of significance. This 
premium declines through time as arbitration eligible players from outside the United States, 
Canada, and Puerto Rico are found to not have statistically significantly different wages than 
arbitration eligible players from United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. This holds true for free 
agent players from outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico as compared to free agent 
players from the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. 
When looking at racial wage penalties, as Model 1 showed, black and Hispanic players 
with 1-3 years of experience face an average wage penalty as compared to white players with 1-3 
years experience of -10.4% and -10.1% respectively, significant at the 10% level of significance 
and the 5% level of significance respectively. This penalty does not hold for black and Hispanic 
arbitration eligible players, as they are not found to have statistically significant wages than 
white arbitration eligible players. As in Model 1, Hispanic players still do not see a statistically 
significant difference in wages during free agency as compared to white free agents, but black 
free agent players see an average wage premium of 19.3% as compared to white free agents, 
which is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. This is slightly larger than the 
wage premium for black free agents as compared white free agents in Model 1, but again, the 
trends remain the same. 
6. Differences in Wages by Race, Nativity, and their interaction with the Inclusion of 
Team Fixed Effects: 
Model 4 adds team fixed effects to Model 3, which again uses variation within teams 
instead of between teams. Table 6 reports the results of Model 4. Holding player, team, and 
demographical characteristics fixed, only players of all contract types from outside the United 
States, Canada, and Puerto Rico who Asian or are from outside the United States, Canada, and 
Puerto Rico and are Hispanic, but not black see statistically significant average wage 
differentials from white players from the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. Players of all 
contract types from outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico who are non-black and 
non-Hispanic have an average wage premium of 39.6% as compared to players of all contract 
types, significant at the 1% level of significance, as compared to white players from the United 
States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. Players of all contract types from outside the United States, 
Canada, and Puerto Rico who are non-black and Hispanic have an average wage premium of 
0.9% as compared to players of all contract types to white players from the United States, 
Canada, and Puerto Rico. This is significant at the 1% level of significance. 
When this model is broken down into samples by contract types again, only players from 
outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico who are non-black non-Hispanic players or 
are from outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico and are Hispanic, but not black see 
statistically significant average wage differentials from white players from the United States, 
Canada, and Puerto Rico during their first three years in the Major Leagues and while they are 
arbitration eligible.  During the first 3 years of their MLB service Non-black Non-Hispanic 
players from outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico have a 92.3% average wage 
premium, significant at the 1% level of significance, as compared to white players from the 
United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico with comparable years if service. While in the arbitration 
eligible period, Non-black Non-Hispanic players from outside the United States, Canada, and 
Puerto Rico have a 46.7% average wage premium, significant at the 1% level of significance, as 
compared to white players from the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico with comparable 
years if service. These trends are comparable to the results of model 3. These wage premiums, 
again are most likely due to the differences in contract status that was discussed in the results of 
model 3. 
During free agency, the only group of players to see an average wage differential as 
compared to white players from the United States, Canada, or Puerto Rico is black players from 
the United States, Canada, or Puerto Rico, who have a 16.6% wage premium as compared to 
white players when player, team, and demographic characteristics are fixed. Model 4 differs only 
from Model 3 in the fact that is shows that black free agents from the US, Canada, and Puerto 
Rico earn more than white free agents from the US, Canada, and Puerto Rico. This is the same 
finding as in Models 1 and 2 showing that this equation holds up to the robustness check 
 
VI. Discussion: 
1. Sample Biases 
There are several issues with my samples, models, and results that require further 
explanation in order to view the results in the correct context. Using an OLS regression model 
requires that several conditions be met in order for the predicted results to be able to be 
interpreted as predictions that are comprehensive for the entire population. One of which is most 
important is random sampling, which I did not use. For my study, random sampling of the 
population of Major League Baseball players would have made my analysis more difficult. 
Random sampling of players in the MLB would have included more players some who are only 
marginal players, who would not have the earnings that full time major league players have or 
adequate sample size to accurately correlate their output with their earnings as discussed in the 
sample description. Additionally, the inclusion of players with less than 200 at bats would 
include lesser-known players, fame would not normally be an issue with econometric analyses of 
labor markets, but the data for MLB players’ salaries exists primarily for players who are well 
known, which tend to be players of higher ability. Having 200 at bats in a season as a floor 
additionally drives up the average level of ability upwards for players, as players who do not 
perform as well do not see as many at bats. This means that my findings may not be 
representative of players of lesser skill or who are only marginal MLB players. Therefore, my 
findings may not hold for the entire population of MLB players, as my sample only looks at 
25.1% of total MLB player-season observations with at least 1 at bat from 2007-2016. Never the 
less, the results of my study hold true for the players in my data sample. 
Additionally there are more issues with my data sample. First, race is not self-reported, so 
my interpretation of player’s race may be different from their own interpretation or the 
interpretation of the owners of their team. My data also comes from a variety of sources, which 
increases the chance of discrepancies between data sources,. There was also the issue of not 
having enough player-season observation from players of Asian descent from the United States, 
Canada, and Puerto Rico to separate them from white players from the US Canada and Puerto 
Rico and the small number of player-season observations of players from outside the United 
States, Canada, and Puerto Rico who were black but not Hispanic.  
Also, my sample contains 50% white player-season observation and significantly less 
observations of each category of non-white players which could be why significant changes in 
average salaries wages are seen when players are broken down by race and ethnicity. However, 
these small samples of players are more likely to show superstar effects than the larger samples 
are, which is why it is permissible to potentially correlate the average wage premiums for black 
free agents to the superstar effects. 
2. Model Design 
The model that I designed was based off of models in previous studies that looked at how 
player, team, and demographic characteristics determine a player’s salary that used the Mincer 
equation. These studies only used the Mincer equation with a squared term, as opposed to the 
higher order quadratic that Lemiuex (2003) suggests, so the effects of experience on salary may 
not correlate as well as they should. However, based on Krautmann et al (2003) I knew that I had 
to limit my model to non-pitchers because pitchers aren’t readily aggregated due to inherent 
differences in their performance, so I did not want to focus my study on them. While ensuring 
that my results aren’t affected by their inclusion, this leaves a large portion of the MLB 
unstudied. My models also lacks controls for a player’s defensive ability, which again means that 
the results are based solely on a player’s individual offensive output and therefore may not 
capture the full abilities of that player. My model also does not account for the superstar effect 
that has been shown in sports to drive a player’s salary up and it does not account for factors that 
may make a team cautious to pay a player more such as frequent injuries and performance 
enhancing drug violations. However, these factors happen on an individual basis instead of at a 
group level so the factors that I included allow for an estimate of how each input affects wages. 
The model that I designed took into account not only player characteristics, but team 
characteristics and the characteristics of the location where a team plays into effect as well. The 
inclusion of these factors is important as wages are affected by factors outside of the player’s 
control in addition to personal characteristics. Holding these features fixed reduces the bias in 
my results because teams with different abilities to attract players could compensate players in 
different manners.  
3. Overall Trends in Results 
Players from outside the US, Canada, and Puerto Rico see a wage premium as compared 
to players from the US, Canada, and Puerto Rico in the first 6 years of their MLB service, which 
is most likely due to the contract structure in the MLB, where these players enter the league as 
free agents and can negotiate with one team, unlike players who enter through the draft who only 
get to negotiate with the team who drafted them. This effect wears off, as expected, when all 
players with similar levels of experience can field multiple offers from different teams. The 
recurrence of average wage penalties for players of Hispanic descent and those initially present 
for black players, as well as the differences in returns to offensive output seen by black players in 
free agency show some evidence of economic discrimination in the MLB. These suggest that 
inequalities in the MLB may be present, but are not present in the long run. Becker (1951) 
suggests that economic discrimination will continue until it becomes too costly for the 
discriminators, which may be why these effects are shown to wear off. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 My study, like previous studies finds mixed evidence of economic discrimination in the 
MLB. My results are similar to that of Palmer and King (2006) and Scully (1974). Like their 
studies, my study is also subject to its limitations, but it suggests that average wage penalties are 
present initially for black and Hispanic players as compared to white players in years 1-3 of their 
MLB Careers, but that these wage penalties may be off-set for higher performing players from 
outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico because they enter the league with free 
agency status, as shown in model 1. However, these wage premiums due to contract status differ 
significantly by race as shown in the results of model 2, which could be a result of 
discrimination. The higher wage premiums for Asian players from outside the United States, 
Canada, and Puerto Rico may be due to the systematic recruiting effects that Ottenson (2014) 
described, or they may be a result of discrimination. Additionally, the wage premium for black 
players from the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico seen in models 1, 2, and 4 could be due 
to the additional returns to each year of experience that Scully finds, or they could be a result of 
the superstar effects of these players described by Lucifer and Simmons (2003). 
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 Tables and Figures 
Table 1a Means Table 
 
Table 1a contains a means table describing the mean values of wages, wRC, & years of experience by player race & nativity 
for players from the United States, Canada, & Puerto Rico. 
 
Table 1b Means Table  
 
 
Table 1b contains a means table describing the mean values of wages, wRC, & years of experience by player race & nativity 
for players from outside the United States, Canada, & Puerto Rico as well as all foreign-born players 
 
  
 Table 2a Means Table of Individual, Team, & Geographic Characteristics of Team 
 
Table 2a is a means table of the other characteristics that were included in my regressions models for players from the United States, Canada, & 
Puerto Rico. 
  
Table 2b Means Table of Individual, Team, & Geographic Characteristics of Team 
 
Table 2b is a means table of the other characteristics that were included in my regressions models for players from outside of the United States, 
Canada, & Puerto Rico. 
  




Table 3 Shows the average difference in wages for all players that are not from the US, Canada, or Puerto Rico as compared to players from these 
countries as well as the average difference in wages for all black & Hispanic players as compared to all white players.  
Table 4 Results of Model 2: Differences in Wages by Race & Nativity Separately with the Inclusion of Team Fixed Effects 
 
 
Table 4 Shows the robustness check for the average difference in wages for all players that are not from the US, Canada, or Puerto Rico as 
compared to players from these countries as well as the average difference in wages for all black & Hispanic players as compared to all white 
players.  
Table 5 Results of Model 3: Differences in Wages by Race, Nativity, & their interaction 
	
 
Table 5 Shows the average difference in wages based upon the player’s race & nativity as compared to a white player from the United States, 
Canada, & Puerto Rico.  




Table 6 Shows the robustness check for the average difference in wages based upon the player’s race & nativity as compared to a white player 
from the United States, Canada, & Puerto Rico.  
Table 7 Results of Model 5 
 
 
Table 7 shows the average additional effects on wages of output for players from outside the US, Canada, & Puerto Rico as compared to players 
from these countries & the average additional effect of output on wages for being black or Hispanic as compared to being white.  
Table 8 Results of Model 6 
 
Table 8 Shows the average additional effects of race & nativity on wages for offensive output as compared to white players from the US, Canada, 
& Puerto Rico. 
 Figure 1: Model 1 Predicted Salaries 
 






























































Model 1 Predictions 
Figure 2: Model 3 Predicted Salaries 
 




























































































































































Model 3 Predictions 
Appendices: 
Appendix A: Major League Baseball Statistics 
1. Weighted Runs Created 
The Weighted Runs Created Statistic was designed by Tom Tango, a 
Sabermetrician in an attempt to quantify a player’s offensive output by crediting the 
player with a value for each outcome. The Weighted Runs Created Statistic ranges from a 
low of 40 for poor performing players to a high of 105 for excellent players. It is a scale 
that is based off of a popular baseball statistic Weighted On Base Average (wOBA) and 
compares an individual player’s wOBA to that of the league with a scale factor that 
varies by year. The formula for wRC, from Fangraphs.com, also my data source of player 
performance is: 
wRC = (((wOBA-League wOBA)/wOBA Scale)+(League R/PA))*PA 
 
Table ## reports the average League wOBA, the wOBA scale & the League R/PA by 
season: 
Season League Average wOBA wOBA Scale League R/PA 
2007 .331 1.192 .124 
2008 .328 1.211 .120 
2009 .329 1.210 .120 
2010 .321 1.251 .115 
2011 .316 1.264 .112 
2012 .315 1.245 .114 
2013 .314 1.277 .110 
2014 .310 1.304 .108 
2015 .313 1.251 .113 
2016 .318 1.212 .118 
Table ##: Summary of constants of determinants of individual wRC. 
2. At Bats 
 The at bat statistic records the number of plate appearances that a player has minus 
situations where the player: “hits a sacrifice bunt or sacrifice fly; is awarded first base on four 
called balls; is hit by a pitched ball; or is awarded first base because of interference or 
obstruction” (Official Baseball Rules 2010). 
 
Appendix B: Fully Described Models 
Differences in Wages by Race & Nativity Separately: 
Formally Model 1 is: 
LLog(wage)= β0+ β1ForeignBorni + β2 Blacki + β3Hispanici+ β4wRC +β5MLBexp + 
β6MLBexp2+ β7catcher+ β8Outfield+ β91B/3B/DH + β10log(teampayroll)+ 
β11playyoffpreviousyear+ β12teamwin%+ β13Al+ β14 + β15log(population size) i+ 
β16%population Hispanici + β17%population blacki + β18 %population immigranti + β19 season 
fixed effectst +µi  
Where i indexes individuals, t indexes time based on MLB seasons and µi denotes the individual 
unobserved error. 
Differences in Wages by Race & Nativity Separately with the Inclusion of Team Fixed 
Effects: 
Formally Model 2 is: 
Log(wage)= β0+ β1ForeignBorni + β2 Blacki + β3Hispanici+ β4wRC+β5MLBexp+ β6MLBexp2+ 
β7catcher+ β8Outfield+ β91B/3B/DH + β10log(teampayroll)+ β11playyoffpreviousyear+ 
β12teamwin%+ β13Al+ β14 + β15log(population size) i+ β16%population Hispanici + 
β17%population blacki + β18 %population immigranti + β19 season fixed effectst+ β20 Team fixed 
Effectsi +µi  
Where i indexes individuals, t indexes time based on MLB seasons and µi denotes the individual 
unobserved error. 
Differences in Wages by Race, Nativity, & their interaction: 
Formally Model 3 is: 
Log(wage)= β0+ β1Foreignborni + β2 Blacki + β3Hispanici+ β4ForeignBorn*Hispanici+ 
β5ForeignBorn*Black*Hispanici+ β6wRC+ β7MLBexp+ β8MLBexp2+ β9catcher+ β10Outfield+ 
β111B/3B/DH + β12log(teampayroll)+ β13playyoffpreviousyear+ β14teamwin%+ β15Al+ 
β16log(population size) i+ β17%population Hispanici + β18%population blacki + β19 %population 
immigranti + β20 season fixed effectst+ +µi  
 
Where i indexes individuals, t indexes time based on MLB seasons and µi denotes the individual 
unobserved error. 
Differences in Wages by Race, Nativity, & their interaction with the Inclusion of Team 
Fixed Effects: 
Formally Model 4 is: 
Log(wage)= β0+ β1Foreignborni + β2 Blacki + β3Hispanici+ β4ForeignBorn*Hispanici+ 
β5ForeignBorn*Black*Hispanici+ β6wRC+ β7MLBexp+ β8MLBexp2+ β9catcher+ β10Outfield+ 
β111B/3B/DH + β12log(teampayroll)+ β13playyoffpreviousyear+ β14teamwin%+ β15Al+ 
β16log(population size) i+ β17%population Hispanici + β18%population blacki + β19 %population 
immigranti + β20 season fixed effectst+ β21 Team fixed Effectsi +µi  
Where i indexes individuals, t indexes time based on MLB seasons and µi denotes the individual 
unobserved error. 
Differences in Productivity on Wages by Race & Nativity separately  
Formally Model 5 is: 
Log(wage)= β0+ β1Foreignborni + β2 Blacki + β3Hispanici β4Foreignborn*wRCit + 
β5Black*wRCit + β6Hispanic*wRCit + β7MLBexp + β8MLBexp2+ β9catcher+ β10Outfield+ 
β111B/3B/DH + β12log(teampayroll)+ β13playyoffpreviousyear+ β14teamwin%+ β15Al+ 
β16log(population size) i+ β17%population Hispanici + β18%population blacki + β19 %population 
immigranti + β20 season fixed effectst +µi  
Where i indexes individuals, t indexes time based on MLB seasons and µi denotes the individual 
unobserved error. 
Model 6: Differences in Productivity on Wages by Race, Nativity, & their interaction  
Formally Model 6 is: 
Log(wage)= β0+ β1Foreignborni + β2 Blacki + β3Hispanici+ β4ForeignBorn*Hispanici+ 
β5ForeignBorn*Black*Hispanici + β6Foreignborn*wRCit + β7Black*wRCit + β8Hispanic*wRCit 
+ β9ForeignBorn*Black*wRCit + β10ForeignBorn*Hispanic*wRCit + 
β11ForeignBorn*Black*Hispanic*wRCit + β12MLBexp + β13MLBexp2+ β14catcher+ β15Outfield+ 
β161B/3B/DH + β17log(teampayroll)+ β18playyoffpreviousyear+ β19teamwin%+ β20Al+ 
β21log(population size) i+ β22%population Hispanici + β23%population blacki + β24%population 
immigranti + β25season fixed effectst +µi   
Where i indexes individuals, t indexes time based on MLB seasons and µi denotes the individual 
unobserved error. 
 
